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NOTES ON HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION1
Jens Rasmussen
Risø National Laboratory
INTRODUCTION
An increasing effort is being put into the study of human error analysis and
quantification. Unfortunately, the need for results has been growing more
rapidly than the research needed to supply the basic knowledge on human
functions in industrial installations and the related human failure mecha-
nisms. Accordingly, the following review will be as much a review of prob-
lems as a survey of possible solutions. However, if the conditions under
which present methods are applicable can be stated explicitly, then these
conditions can be used as design criteria for systems by serving as "criteria
of analyzability". Those criteria can then be modified or released as more ef-
ficient methods of analysis and better data become available.
RISK ANALYSIS, THEORY, AND PRACTICE
When discussing the role of the human element in industrial reliability and
safety analysis, it is worthwhile to consider the relation between risk analy-
sis and the actual, real life risk of losses due to accidental events.
The outcome of an analysis of the risk imposed by an industrial plant or
system is a theoretical construct which relates empirical data describing
functional and failure properties of components and parts of a system to a
quantitative or qualitative statement of the over all risk to be expected from
the operation of the system. This relation is derived from a definition of the
boundaries of the system considered; a model describing the structure of the
system and its functional properties in the relevant normal and accidental
states; together with a number of assumptions made to facilitate the math-
ematical modeling. These assumptions, the model, and the source of the
empirical data, are equally as important parts of the result of the risk anal-
ysis as the statement of risk level found. Therefore, in the overall judgment
of the risk potential of the system, it is necessary to consider different cate-
gories of risk:
• Accepted Risks. These are the risks related to the states of accidental
maloperation and to the causes and effects considered in the analysis. It
goes without saying that any risk of unacceptable magnitude uncovered
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during an analysis will result in a change of the design. The functions of the
operating staff in the operation and maintenance of the system will be an
important part of this analysis.
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Figure 1. The most important result from a risk analysis is not the accepted risk figure, but
the models, data, and assumptions which should serve as instructions for operation.
• Oversights and Design Errors. The quality of a risk analysis depends
upon the completeness of the analysis. In modern complex industrial instal-
lations based on very large production units, an important contribution to
the overall risk is due to "major loss" situations of very low probability, often
resulting from a complex chain of events including coincidence of errors and
from a priori improbable failure modes. Therefore, sources of risk hidden
behind an in complete analysis become a major problem. Whether such dis-
crepancies between the analytical model and the actual plant are considered
to be design errors or errors of analysis depends upon what is taken for
given. The general problem of verifying the completeness of an analysis and
thus insuring that a safety-related design target has been met, can very
probably lead to the need for criteria related to "design for risk analyzability".
• Errors of Management. The value of a risk analysis largely depends upon
the degree to which the actual, operating plant will satisfy the conditions
and assumptions underlying the analysis. Again, this largely depends upon
the managerial organization within the plant. This type of risk is related to
such activities as planning of quality control, inspection, and testing which
serve to ensure that the components and parts of the plant do match the
populations forming the base for the empirical fault data, and that the plant
is built according to the design specification and will not be subject to
modifications and changes without proper risk evaluations. This relates to
the technical equipment as well as to selection, training, and organization of
operating staff and to the design of work procedures and operating in-
structions.
It lies in the nature of oversights and errors of management that they are
tied to human errors, but it also lies in the variety and complexity of organi-
zations and design activities that quantitative risk modeling in these areas is
practically impossible at present. However, a comprehensive qualitative
analysis has been made by Johnson (1973).
The following discussion of the systematic analysis of the human role in
system reliability and safety will be concerned with the analysis behind the
first category of risk discussed in the previous section (i.e. accepted risks). It
follows from the nature of things that over sights are not included. "Errors of
management" are violating the basic assumptions of the systematic
methods, and they are therefore not considered explicitly in the discussion.
However, what is meant by "systematic analysis" is not always evident and
invites some discussion. In the present paper, systematic method will be
synonymous to engineering analysis when viewed as the alternative to expert
judgment, which is taken to be more akin to the performance of a profes-
sional art. In general, engineering analysis is based on quantitative data and
invariate relations applied to systems and structure which are accessible to
inspection or control. Practically speaking, the opposite is often the case for
the behavioral sciences which depend upon personal, professional skills. It
is a "well-known fact that the aim of a skillful performance is achieved by
the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person
following them" (Polanyi 1958). Clearly, great care should be taken when in-
cluding human behavior in engineering models. In addition, a drastic limi-
tation in the cases which can be handled must be expected, if the analysis is
to be based on formalized, systematic methods rather than on expert judg-
ment.
Of course the importance of this aspect depends upon the application of
the reliability and safety analysis. If the analysis is used for a relative rank-
ing of different alternative solutions during system design, a number of
conditions can be considered equal, and the criteria for analyzability will
lead to less tight constraints compared with the situation where the analysis
aims at a verification or documentation of the design target in terms of
quantitative risk level.
A special problem is caused by current developments of large scale com-
puter codes for overall system reliability and safety analysis. This develop-
ment is ahead of the formulation of acceptable models of human functions
and error mechanisms in the systems under consideration.
Consequently, the only solution for the time being is to include simplistic
models of human performance. To be compatible, such models are
depending on the mathematical or logical structure of the program rather
than on psychological properties. This is acceptable as long as such human
error models are used only for sensitivity analysis, to determine the range of
uncertainty due to human influences. If quantitative risk figures are de
rived, these should be qualified by the assumptions underlying the human
error models used, and by a verification of the correspondence of the
assumptions to the system which is analyzed.
"HUMAN ERROR" - DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION
The term "human error" is loaded and very ambiguous. Basically, a human
error is committed if the effect of human behavior exceeds a limit of accept-
ability. Of course, the classification of a specific behavior as an error de-
pends as much upon the limits of acceptability as it depends upon the be-
havior itself. In practice, the limits are sometimes defined after the fact, by
someone who can base his judgments on a careful, rational evaluation of the
function of the system, while the specific behavior possibly was a quick
response in a stressed dynamic situation. Therefore, as it has been argued
by Rook (1965) and Swain (1969), it is necessary to distinguish clearly
between errors induced by inappropriate limits of acceptability; i.e., by the
design of the work situation, and errors caused by inappropriate human
behavior. Furthermore, as discussed by Rigby (1969), errors can be
classified as random errors, due to random variability of human performance
such as variations in manual precision or force; differences in timing; simple
mistakes; and slips of memory; as systematic errors which can be caused by
personal abnormalities or inappropriate system design; and, finally, sporadic
errors, occasional "faux pas" which are infrequent and often unexplainable
erroneous actions. From this definition it follows that it is difficult to give
general characteristics of sporadic errors.
The influence from random errors largely depends upon the extent to
which the limits of acceptability can be arranged to span the range of natu-
ral variability of performance of the people selected to the task, and the op-
portunity given the operator to monitor his performance and correct the er-
rors he commits.
Systematic errors can be related deterministically to specific properties of
the work situation and can be eliminated if the causal relations can be
identified and changed. It is a very important category of errors within the
context of monitoring and supervisory task in auto mated systems where the
operators typically have to respond to changes in system operation by cor-
rective actions.
In the present general discussion, two types of systematic errors seem to
be important and should be considered:
First, human responses to changes in a system will be systematically
wrong if task demands exceed the limits of capability. Demands and capabil-
ity may conflict at several aspects of a task such as time required, avail
ability of state information, background knowledge on system functioning,
etc. The operator must be able to trade off demands and limitations by
choice of a proper strategy. An example would be for the operator to remove
time constraints by first bringing the system to a safe, stationary state.
Secondly, systematic human errors may be caused by several kinds of
procedural traps. During normal work condition human operators are
extremely efficient due to a very effective adaptation to convenient,
representative signs and signals. On the other hand, these will very probably
lead the man into difficulties when the behavior of the system changes. An
operator will only make conscious observations if his attention is alerted by
an interrupt from the subconscious processes. This means that he will only
deal with the environment consciously when his subconscious, automated,
or habitual responses no longer will control the environment adequately.
Likewise, he cannot be expected to cope with a new unique change or event
in the system in the problem oriented way of thinking if the interrupt is
caused by information, which immediately associates to a familiar task or
action. It is very likely that familiar associations based on representative,
but insufficient information will prevent the operator from realizing the need
to analyze a complex, unique situation. He may more readily accept the
improbable coincidence of several familiar faults in the system rather than
the need to investigate one new and complex fault of low probability. In this
way, the efficiency of man's internal world model allows him to be selective
and therefore to cope effectively with complex systems in familiar situations,
and, at the same time, may lead him into traps which are easily seen after
the fact. Davis concludes from an analysis of traffic accidents (Davis, 1958):
"It is usual for a person to have expectations, or to hold to what may be
called an hypothesis about every situation he meets, even when information is
notably incomplete. This hypothesis, which is in some degree the product of
his previous experience of similar situations, governs the way in which he
perceives the situation and the way in which he organizes the perceptual
material available to him. As he receives further information, his hypothesis
tends to be modified or amended or abandoned and replaced. Sometimes,
however, an hypothesis and the expectations which go with it, appear to be
unduly resistant to change."
The importance of the different categories of errors depends upon the task
conditions. In repetitive tasks which are preplanned, errors due to demands
exceeding resource limits and errors due to procedural traps, etc., will be of
minor importance since when experienced they are readily removed by re-
design of the task. Therefore, random errors related to human variability
would typically be more prevalent.
On the other hand, systematic errors are significant contributors when
operators have to respond to abnormal plant condition during monitoring
and supervisory tasks. Reviews indicate that failure of human operators to
identify abnormal states of a plant or system plays an important role in ac-
cidents and incidents in complex systems (Rasmussen 1969, Cornell 1968).
However, even if the state of the system is correctly identified, the operator
may still be caught in a procedural trap. A familiar, stereotyped sequence of
actions may be initiated from a single conscious decision or association from
the system state. If the corresponding procedure takes some time; e.g., it is
necessary to move to another place to perform it, the mind may return to
other matters, and the subconscious actions will become vulnerable to
interference, particularly if part of the sequence is identical to other heavily
automated sequences. Systematic human errors in unfamiliar tasks are
typically caused by interference from other more stereotyped situations and,
therefore, the potential for systematic errors depends very much upon the
level of the operator's skill. The fact that operators can control a system
successfully during a commissioning and test period is no proof that opera-
tors will continue to do so during the plant life time.
A basic problem when dealing with systematic erroneous responses to
unfamiliar situation is the very low probability of such complex situations.
In a properly designed system there should be a reverse relation between the
probability of occurrence of an abnormal situation and its potential effect in
terms of losses and damage. In modern large centralized systems, the conse-
quence of faults can be very serious and consequently the effect of human
errors in situations of extremely low probability must be considered. In such
cases, the potential for systematic errors cannot be identified from experi-
ence, but only by a systematic functional analysis of realistic scenarios
modeling the relevant situations.
Sporadic errors are, by definition, infrequent errors which are not caused
by excessive variation in the normal pattern of behavior, but rather are ex-
traneous acts with peculiar effects. They must be considered in risk analysis
even though they are insignificant contributors to error rates because they
are likely to escape the designer's attention. Therefore, they may not be cov-
ered by the automatic protective systems and can cause chains of event with
large consequences.
RELIABILITY AND SAFETY ANALYSIS
In discussing the methodological problems of including the human element
of a system in a systematic analysis, it appears to be practical to consider
the problems related to reliability analysis and safety analysis separately.
The terms, safety and reliability, are not too well defined. In the following
discussion, they are used to characterize two different aspects of the sensi-
tivity of a process plant to accidental maloperation.
Reliability is a measure of the ability of a system to maintain the specified
function. Classical reliability analysis leads to figures describing the prob-
ability that a system will perform the specified function during a given period
or at a given time (M.T.B.F., Availability, etc.) Reliability analysis is related to
the effects caused by absence of specified function. In case of a process plant
reliability, figures are used to judge the expected average loss of production;
in case of a safety system to judge the expected average loss of protection.
System safety is related to the risk, i.e., the expected average losses,
caused directly by the presence of a state of accidental maloperation, in terms
of human injuries, loss of equipment etc. To judge the safety of a system, it
is, therefore, necessary to study the probability of specific courses of events
initiated by the primary fault, and to relate the probability to the effects of
the maloperation, i.e., judgment of system safety is based upon an extensive
accident analysis.
In the following discussion a very clear-cut distinction between the meth-
ods used for reliability and safety analyses is drawn, and very simplistic de-
scriptions of the methods are used. This is tolerable since the purpose of the
discussion is to reach some general conclusions regarding the conditions
which should be met by a system in order to make a systematic risk analysis
possible.
HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The definition of the reliability of a system or system component is generally
stated in terms of the probability of a specified function versus time, such
as: "Reliability is defined as that characteristic of an item expressed by the
probability that it will per form its required function in the desired manner
under all relevant conditions and on the occasion or during the time inter-
vals when it is required so to perform" (Green and Bourne 1972).
Reliability analysis is concerned with the departure from the specified
function of the plant and its parts and components. "Specified function" is
rather stable during plant operation and is unambiguous related to the
functional design intention. Therefore, the frame of reference of reliability
analysis is generally well established. The basic method of reliability analysis
is to decompose a complex system into parts or components, to a level at
which component properties are recognized from widespread use, so that
empirical fault data can be collected. In principle, this break-down must be
carried through to a level where component function is invariate with appli-
cation. This is possible for many standard components, which are designed
for a specific function and used according to specifications in system design,
e.g., resistors, pumps. In some cases, however, alternative "specified func-
tions" are possible at the level of break down at which data collection can be
arranged.  For example, in practice relays and valves can serve to close or
break a circuit. Fault data must then be classified according to the function
performed, as the related probabilities of failure may be very different for
different functions.
Overall reliability characteristics of the system are derived by means of
models representing the relations between component and system failures.
The degree of sophistication of the probabilistic system models used to de-
rive reliability figures characterizing the total system depend upon the qual-
ity of the component fault data available. If only bulk data on component
failure rates are available, as is typically the case for process plant compo-
nents, simple probabilistic models are used which represent system struc-
ture only as far as to specify whether components functionally are connected
in series or parallel during specified system function (reliability block dia-
grams, simple fault trees). If more detailed descriptions of failure mecha-
nisms are available, and if good data are available for failure and repair
rates, then much more complete failure modeling becomes worth while.
In the methods of human reliability prediction in practical use (Meister
1971, Swain 1973), this technique has been transferred to human perfor-
mance. The complex and often very system-specific human functions are
broken down into typical, recurrent functions for which re liability data can
be collected. Such elementary functions are in practice only distinguishable
by their external effects, and are therefore generally characterized as "sub-
tasks". This technique must, however, be used with caution, since the hu-
man element within a technical system has properties which cause difficul-
ties with respect to the basic aspects of reliability analysis:
Man is an adaptive and learning system element, and may very probably
re-specify a function or a task. Consider for example a monitoring task from
a power plant. The specified task: "If the frequency meter indicates below 58
C/S, disconnect load to save the generator". If an operator has only met
readings below 58 C/S due to poor meter performance, he may very reason-
ably re-specify his task: "If ...., then calibrate meter" - and lose a generator
(as happened at one stage in the US power black out in 1965). Unless such
re-specifications are known, reliability prediction will be systemsystemati-
cally wrong.
Furthermore, a human operator is a multipurpose element. He may be oc-
cupied by another task, and omission of specified function may be due to
other events in the system rather than human failure mechanisms.
Man is in many respects a holistic data processor responding to total situ-
ations rather than to individual events or system states. Complex functions
may be per formed by skilled operators as one integrated and auto mated re-
sponse. In this case fault data can only be obtained by a realistic simulation
of the total function (Regulinski 1973). Break-down of complex functions is
only acceptable if the performance is paced by the system, i.e., cues from the
system serve to initiate elementary skilled subroutines individually and to
control their sequence. This is the case in many manual tasks, e.g., mechan-
ical assembly tasks, but can probably also be arranged by more complex
mental tasks by properly designed interface systems.
The failure properties of a specific function depend upon the operating
conditions, and for technical components weighting functions are generally
used to modify fault data according to load and environmental effects. The
great variability of human performance makes a similar weighting of fault
data by "performance shaping factors" mandatory (Swain 1973), but the
application is difficult as "operating conditions", such as motivation, stress,
fatigue, etc., are badly defined and difficult to quantify; "expert judgments"
are generally the only method available.
New problems arise if several internal mechanisms with very different fail-
ure probabilities can serve the same external component function. The more
flexible a component is, the more difficult will these problems be, especially
if the internal organization has autonomous features such as optimization,
adaptation, learning. These are the prominent features of the human ele-
ments in a system. The internal process used to perform a specific external
task by a man depends strongly upon his training and skill, his prior experi-
ences of system behavior, his subjective performance criteria etc. Failure
data collected from a system in which an operator meets a specific task fre-
quently and performs it by a sensory-motor response will have no relation to
the failure probability in a system where the demand for the task is infre-
quent, e.g., as part of an emergency action. The response will then probably
be performed by a sequence of cognitive functions. The resulting problem
can only be solved by classifying fault data according to the internal
functions used to perform a task. In this situation, weighting of fault data
collected from standard, frequently initiated tasks, by means of
"performance shaping factors" is not acceptable. At present, this means that
human reliability prediction is only feasible, if "specified function" of human
operators is synonymous with a familiar task per formed by a skill
maintained through frequent use or exercise.
A human trait having great influence upon the reliability of human per-
formance is the ability of self monitoring and error correction. The mechanism
of error detection depends upon the task situation and the intention of the
operator. If the intention is to perform a given sequence of actions, as will be
the case in most familiar and stereotyped tasks, error detection will typically
be due to difficulties in the sequence caused by errors in the preceding
steps. It is obvious that this kind of error detection has drastic effects on re
liability. The probability of selecting the wrong key in your key-ring is high;
however, the probability that you should not succeed in entering your house
of this reason is nil.
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Fig. 2.  Simplified illustration of typical task structures.
In more open and flexible situations, the human intentions will typically be
related to attainment of a specific goal, and the reliability in reaching the
goal will be related to the persistence in the intention and the care with
which a discrepancy is observed or detected, rather than error probability
during the striving towards the goal. If you intend to spend a comfortable
night reading a good book, the probability of success is not related to the er-
ror rate in operating the lamp switch nor to the reliability of the power sys-
tem, but rather to the probability of having a supply of candles and matches
or the proximity of a good restaurant.
Clearly, the error correction features of a task depend upon the structure
of the sequence, and not on the individual steps. The potential for error cor-
rection influences the reliability of the task drastically and determines which
parts of the task should be considered in detail as well as the data needed in
an analysis.
Monitoring and error correction act as a feed-back loop around the task
performance, and the overall quality of the basic performance itself. In addi-
tion to the use of this feed-back feature to improve the reliability of a task
design, a proper design of the error detection and correction function can be
used as the means for making a reliability analysis of the total task practi-
cal, since the lower limit of the overall reliability can be determined inde-
pendently of the error rate by the re liability of the monitoring function alone
together with the frequency of error opportunities. This may be the only way
to assess the reliability of poorly structured complex human performance -
e.g. in response to unfamiliar situations. It should also be noted that the
influence of error correction features of a task will lead to a strong
dependence of the error rates collected for human actions upon the context
from which they are collected.
To sum up, systematic analysis and quantification of system reliability is
not feasible unless the design of the system and the work situation of its
operators satisfy some general conditions. Necessary conditions for the use
of decomposition methods to predict the probability that a specified task is
performed satisfactorily by human operators are:
- there is no significant contribution from systematic errors due to redefini-
tion of task, interference from other tasks or activities, etc.;
and
- the task can be broken down to a sequence of separate subtasks at a level
where failure data can be obtained from similar work situations;
and
- these subtasks are cued individually by the system or by other external
means, so that systematic modification of procedure does not take place;
or
- if these conditions are not satisfied, e.g., because the task is performed as
one integrated whole, or it is performed by complex and variable human
functions such as higher level cognitive functions, then the effect of the
task must be reversible and subject to an error detection and correction
function, which in turn satisfies the above-mentioned conditions for
predict ability.
In this discussion it has been assumed that empirical data on human error
rates in industrial process plants are available. Unfortunately, such data are
very scarce. Most of the data discussed in the literature seem to be derived
from the original work done at the American Institute of Research (Payne et
al. 1962, Munger et al. 1962) or to be very general estimates. Systematic
data collection in industrial plants has not been reported apart from the
Licensee Event Reports published by US-NRC (see later). Error rates are dif-
ficult to derive from these reports because the denominators, the number of
error opportunities, are not known. An attempt to estimate the denomina-
tors to be used with the Licensee Event Reports has been made by Fullwood
et al. 1976.
HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN SAFETY ANALYSIS
System safety is related to the risk, i.e. the expected average loss, in terms of
human injuries or dam age to equipment or environment, caused by transi-
tions from specified function into a state of accidental maloperation.
System safety has to be judged from an extensive accident analysis. To
identify the course of events following the initiating fault, and to determine
the ultimate effect, and its probability, it is necessary to use a detailed
functional description of the system including functional properties both
within and outside the normal operating regimes of the plant. Different sys-
tematic techniques have been developed for this purpose, based on fault tree
analysis (Fussel 1973, Powers 1973) and cause -consequence analysis
(Nielsen 1971, Taylor 1977).
To evaluate the effects of accidental maloperation, statistical data differ-
entiating the different modes of failure of the components must be available.
Furthermore, severe effects are generally results of course of events of ex-
tremely low probability, and may be related to component modes of failure
which are a priori improbable and insignificant contributors to component
bulk data.
In the analysis of accidents, the human element is the imp of the system.
The human reliability, i.e., the probability that operators perform the
"specified functions" is of course an important factor in system safety, e.g.
when operators are assigned special monitoring and protective functions. In
safety analysis, however, a more difficult problem is the analysis of the effect
of specific, erroneous human acts. The variability and flexibility of human
performance together with human inventiveness make it practically impos-
sible to predict the effects of an operator's actions when he makes errors,
and it is impossible to predict his reaction in a sequence of accidental
events, as he very probably misinterprets an unfamiliar situation.
These cases indicate that search strategies used to identify accidental
chains of events in the technical system will not be adequate to identify the
human potential for creating hazardous situations. In general, search
strategies related to fault tree analysis and cause-con sequence analysis are
sufficient to identify the effects on one part of a system from errors which an
operator commits during work on that part due to mistakes etc. How ever,
contrary to reliability analysis, a safety analysis cannot solely be based on
search strategies which use the specified task as a guide or structure.
Effective search strategies have to take into account the fact that operators
are multipurpose components moving freely around in the system. Rare, but
risky events in one part of the system can be caused by erroneous acts by
operators working on quite different parts of the system; such as disconnec-
tion of cables to facilitate vacuum cleaning; interference from manipulation
of electric welding gear; short circuits from dropped tools. These types of er-
rors must be found by a search guided by a topographical proximity
criterion - analysis of all activity close to the part of the system in question.
Furthermore, psychological proximity should be considered. It happens that
features of an unfamiliar situation demanding a special procedure instead
release an automated routine belonging to other task conditions, especially if
parts of the two task sequences psychologically speaking are very similar.
Examples are given in the case stories in the appendix.
However, a heuristic search based on these criteria may not be sufficient
to identify the potential for high consequence, low probability situations
which typically are related to complex situations caused by several coinci-
dent abnormal conditions and events. A heuristic strategy to identify such
situations resembles a design algorithm: First, potential for accidents such
as high energy accumulations, toxic material concentrations etc. are identi-
fied together with potential targets for accidental release such as people,
environment etc. Then possible accidents are designed, i.e., the technical
(mal) functions and human actions which are necessary to form the route
from source to target are determined. Finally, it is determined how changes
in the normal system together with coincident normal and abnormal human
activities will meet the designed accident pattern. Such accidents are some-
times due to "sneak paths" which are formed by minor mishaps or malfunc-
tions in simultaneous human activities which only become risky in case of
very specific combinations and timing.
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Fig.3. Simplified illustration of typical structures of analysis.
In practice, therefore, human variability makes a quantitative safety anal-
ysis unrealistic, unless the system design satisfies a number of conditions.
Like other problems in system design caused by component performance the
problems in accident analysis can be circumvented if feed-back functions
are introduced, i.e., if feed-back links are introduced in accidental courses of
events by means of monitoring and correction functions, as it has also been
discussed in the previous section. Major losses or human injuries caused by
accidental mal operation are typically related to uncontrolled release of
stored energy in the system. Apart from accidents caused by spontaneous
fractures of energy barriers and explosions, accidents are typically the
effects of disturbances of mass or energy balances. There is, therefore, a
time delay between the primary cause and the release due to the integrating
effect of a disturbed balance. This time delay makes correcting actions
possible.
Furthermore, critical variables related to the energy level of the balance
can be found which can indicate potentially risky maloperation irrespective
of the preceding course of events. If a safe state of the system can be
defined, and it can be reached through the action of a monitoring and
protection function which does not in it self introduce potential risks, an
upper bound of the probability of a large class of event sequences leading to
the effect which is monitored can be found by a re liability analysis of the
protecting function together with the frequency of error opportunities. Such
protective functions can be performed by human operators if the task is
designed so as to be accessible to human operator reliability analysis, or can
be performed by automatic safety systems.
A properly designed protective function enables the derivation of the prob-
ability figures needed in accident analysis by means of a reliability analysis
of the protective function. Together with data on the frequency of error op-
portunities, this analysis leads directly to upper bounds on probability of
courses of events leading to the effect which is monitored. It is the extensive
use of automatic, protective systems in nuclear power plants that has made
it possible to perform a quantitative analysis - including human performance
- of the safety level of such installations (Norman Rasmussen et al. 1975).
The difficulty to get the empirical data from real life situations needed to
predict the probability of specific erroneous human acts which are possible
contributors to rare chains of events leading to accidents, results in the
following conditions for quantification of system safety:
The probability of specific consequences of accidental events in a system
can only be derived by a decomposition analysis:
- it can be demonstrated that the effect of erroneous human acts are not
significant contributors to the probability; if necessary by introduction of
interlocks or barriers which prevent human interaction;
or
- the effects of erroneous human acts are reversible and detectable by a
monitoring or safety function which can be performed by operators or au-
tomatically.
If the reliability of such barriers and safety functions can be quantified then
an upper bound of the probability of the event in question can be derived
from the frequency of error opportunities.
THE TASK OF CALIBRATION AND TESTING
As a basis of a more specific discussion, the task of calibration and testing
has been chosen since it has a great influence upon the reliability of auto-
matic safety systems. The following data are based on a review of "Licensee
Event Reports" as they are edited and compiled by "Nuclear Power
Experience". The reports reviewed are from the January 1978 state of the
collection and include those in the category of operator/technician errors:
calibration, setting and testing.
In general, reliable statistical information on human error rates related to
different types of human errors is difficult to gather from this kind of event
reporting. While the denominator problem of obtaining the actual frequency
of error opportunities can be solved in principle, the reports do not actually
give information on the total frequency of errors committed, but rather the
frequency of errors which are not immediately corrected by the operator
himself. This means that the frequencies of different categories of errors
found in the reports are heavily biased by factors depending upon the
specific work situations. Clearly, human errors which lead to latent system
faults or to effects which are not reversible by immediately counteraction will
typically find their way to the reports.
To judge the effect of error recovery and to relate the errors found in the
reports to task content in general, a description of the task in rather general
terms is useful. Generally, the task of calibration is a well defined, procedu-
ralized task. The system states, goals and procedures implied in the task are
familiar to the operator and subject to formal instruction and training. The
errors to be expected are typically omission of steps in the procedure and
faults/mistakes related to rather elementary acts. Problems related to con-
flicts of goals and misinterpretation of system states, which are typical of
responses to unfamiliar situations, are of minor importance in the present
context.
The task of calibration consists of subtasks of different content, and a
preliminary review of the case stories indicates that the following phases
should be treated separately:
1. Establishment of the test circuit. The component or subsystem to be tested
is isolated from the plant and connected to the test equipment.
2. The calibration act. The test equipment and/or the sub system to be tested
is manipulated or adjusted according to a specified procedure, and the
response is compared/judged according to the specified standard in order
to obtain agreement.
3. Restoration of normal operating condition of the system. The test equipment
is removed, and the normal "line-up" of valves and switches in the system
is restored.
Task Elements
Test circuit
set-up
Adjustment;
calibration
Restoration
of normal
operation
Omissions Functionally iso-
lated acts
12 50
Others 1 2 1
Errors in
task
Improvisation, in-
sufficient knowl-
edge
2
Secondary condi-
tions not consid-
ered
3 3 3
Misinterpretation 2 2
Mistakes among
alternatives
4 13 3
Manual variabil-
ity, 'clumsiness'
1 1
Topographic mis-
orientation
3
Extraneous
acts
'Clumsiness' 1
Table 1. Human error modes in 111 cases from test and calibration in nuclear power plants
The principal observation is the high contribution from omissions of steps in
the procedure. It should be noted that nearly all these steps are functionally
unrelated to the calibration itself and include such things as return of
switches or valves to operating position after test; check of standby channels
before disconnecting a channel for test; or purely administrative steps (table
1). It should also be noted that most of the omitted steps are found in the
last phase of the task. One explanation of the large contribution from such
omissions could be that the effect of these omissions is not directly apparent
which therefore prevents any immediate recovery. How ever, this may not be
the only cause. The fact that the steps omitted are unrelated to the prime
goal of the task - the calibration - may in itself lead to a high probability of
omission. In an analogous context, Whorf (1956) in analyzing causes of
industrial fires observes that "the name of a situation affects behavior" -
which can lead to similar effects. It is also noteworthy that this type of error
to some extent is repeated in several redundant channels (see table 2).
Number of Channels Number of Cases
1 95
2 11
3 2
4 2
17 1
Table 2. Common mode errors in test and calibration
Another significant class of errors are "faults and mistakes" which mainly
include two types: One is mistakes such as replacement of sample size with
that of another task; use of positive correction factor instead of negative;
calibration with increasing pressure instead of decreasing, etc. Another type
is the faults concerned with incorrect or inaccurate set points. This class of
error is most significant within the calibration act itself, which is the only
part of the task subject to quantitative specifications and which may lead to
mistakes without immediate detectable functional effects. Broadly speaking,
we here have two related kinds of error: Variability and inaccuracy in a
quantitatively specified adjustment and mistaken interchange of two or more
possibilities.
During the first phase of the task, the establishment of the test circuit,
the different types of errors all contribute. This might be expected a priori,
since this phase gives the operator most freedom for action, and there will be
large differences in task conditions between different types of circuits or
components to be tested or calibrated. Again the largest group is omission of
functionally isolated - including administrative - acts. Extraneous acts are
found only in this phase, and two types are noted - effects on other systems
can be caused by in appropriate spatial orientation such as misplacement of
jumpers, or by simple "clumsiness".
One type of error affecting all three phases is due to change of procedures
in a way that secondary features affect the calibration, i.e. influence of
properties of the system which are not effective or obvious when the pre-
scribed procedure is used. They may have the character of procedure "im-
provements": Adding recorders (which load signal sources); too rapid ad-
justments (not considering time constants); use of another available size of
filter paper (which changes calibration) etc.
The following comments can be made regarding the predictability of the
reliability of this specific task:
• Systematic errors play a minor role in the cases considered.
• The task of calibration can be broken down into rather independent
subtasks which are frequently performed and for which empirical
fault data therefore can be collected. Error rates of the following
categories of error are relevant:
- Omission of acts which are functionally isolated from the task se-
quence.
- Using the wrong alternative of two possible, when the choice has no
functional effect upon the subsequent steps.
- Spread in accuracy when adjusting variables to reference values.
- Operational "improvement" of procedures by exclusion of secondary
conditions which have no immediate influence upon the task.
There is no indication in the cases reviewed that extraneous acts committed
during work on other systems or during other activities play any role in the
availability of the systems. In some cases mis-calibration or defeat of system
function is explained in the event report by such extraneous, inadvertent
acts, but the number is insignificant.
Special problems are found in redundant safety systems in attempting to
predict the probability of repetition of errors in subsequent calibration tasks.
The cases reviewed indicate that repetition of "omission of functionally
isolated acts" in subsequent tasks plays an important role, but, as could be
expected, there is also an indication that systematic errors caused by
misinterpretations and operational "procedure improvements" play a much
more significant role in the overall re liability of redundant systems.
Therefore, to make probabilistic prediction meaningful, Strict control of the
task sequence and its content by constraints from equipment design is nec-
essary to limit effectively the possibility of improvisation and "improvement".
This also places a need for hard constraints upon the managerial system,
which can be the source of changes leading to common mode errors.
In passing it should be mentioned that the causes behind the dominant
types of human errors can very probably be removed through a proper
design of equipment and work content. For instance, equipment can be
designed so as to link necessary, but functionally isolated acts, tightly to
other acts which lead to immediate apparent functional effects if they are
omitted. From the present review of event reports it appears that even a
simple reliability analysis of the task sequence, based on human reliability
data presently available, can support a redesign of the calibration task.
In conclusion, the features of the task of calibration and testing are such
that the reliability of the task can be estimated if empirical error rates can
be obtained.
The Licensee Event Reports supply valuable information on human errors
in this task, but further in-plant investigations are needed to supply denom-
inator figures or error rates. Furthermore, analysis of operator's opportuni-
ties of self-monitoring and error correction in the specific work situations
will be needed to facilitate general use of the data.
CONCLUSION
In principle, a process plant design, which is not based on extensive experi-
ence from similar concepts, is only acceptable if performance design targets
can be verified by systematic analysis including a quantitative re liability
and safety analysis.
A quantitative safety analysis is only possible if the plant design is per-
formed according to guidelines derived from the limitations of the available
methods.
The design must be based upon a qualitative accident analysis. Accident
potentials cannot be identified by an evaluation of the effects of all possible
courses of accidental events. They must be identified directly by a systematic
search. Heuristic search strategies related to energy and poisonous matter
concentrations have been developed to serve this purpose (Johnson 1973,
Powers 1973).
When accident potentials are identified in this way, the sequences of ac-
cidental events, which are capable of triggering an accident, must be identi-
fied by a systematic, qualitative cause-consequence or fault tree analysis. If
a quantitative probabilistic evaluation of the sequences so identified indi-
cates unacceptable risk - or if a quantitative analysis is not possible due to
lack of statistical data, monitoring and protection functions must be intro-
duced in the design.
Such functions must be designed so as to be accessible to a quantitative
reliability analysis. During the reliability analysis of complex protective sys-
tems, it is generally important to keep track of the temporal relations of
events, and simple reliability block diagram analysis must be replaced by
more sophisticated methods, such as Markov models, renewal theory etc.,
compatible with an analysis of causal chains of events.
A protective function can be performed by an automatic system or a hu-
man operator.
Reliability analysis of human performance is only feasible if the tasks are
performed by sequences of skilled subroutines which are separated and
initiated by proper cues from the system. The reliability of more complex and
free-running tasks cannot be predicted directly; an acceptable prediction of
results can only be made in this situation if the effects of the actions are re-
versible and subject to verification by an operator, following a predictable
check procedure, or covered by an automatic protective function.
Automation in this way does not remove man from a system, neither does
it force him into the role of a trained robot. Automation serves to replace
unexpected tasks at unpredictable moments by tasks which can be planned
and trained and which can be based upon qualified decisions, such as su-
pervision, test, and maintenance.
A proper design policy will decrease the influence of unpredictable perfor-
mance shaping factors, such as stress and motivation. When introducing
automatic safety systems, the designer takes responsibility of plant safety
and thus relieves the operator from stress. The actions of safety systems are
related to rather general criteria concerning the initiating plant states and
complex, safe protective systems will decrease plant reliability. The operator
thus has a supervisory task to protect the plant from unnecessary automatic
safety actions. The responsibility of the operators is related to the reliability
of plant operation.
The motivation of plant operators can be maintained in automatic systems
if they are allowed to use their abilities and take responsibility in the tasks
they are allocated. There is no reason not to permit this as long as the
system is designed in a way which allows them to verify the effects of their
decisions and actions in a predictable way.
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APPENDIX
The following case stories illustrate some of the phenomena which make re-
liability and safety prediction difficult. Unless otherwise indicated, they have
been obtained from private communications with process plant operators. In
such cases details have been deleted and the information generalized to
avoid reference to the source.
CASE 1
During normal operation of a process plant the power supply to the instru-
mentation and the control console slowly disappears.
Investigation
The manual main circuit breaker in a motor-generator supply is found to be
in the off position. The conclusion of an investigation was that a roving op-
erator, inadvertently had switched from a routine check-round to the Friday
afternoon shut down check-round and turned off the supply. The routes of
the two check-rounds are the same, except that he is supposed to pass by
the door of the generator room on the routine check, but to enter and turn
off the supply on the shut down check. Something "en route" obviously has
conditioned him for shut down check (sunshine and day dreams?). The oper-
ator was not aware of his action, but did not reject the explanation.
Comments
Human operators move around in the plant, and it can be difficult to predict
where in the causal structure of the plant he interferes. His actions may not
be initiated by an event in the system or specified by a program, but by sub-
conscious mechanisms, i.e. it is difficult to predict when he interferes and
how.
CASE 2
During start up of a process plant the plant is automatically shut down
during manual adjustment of a cooling system.
Investigation
During start-up the operator monitored the temperature of a primary cooling
system and controlled it by switching off and on a secondary cooling pump
to avoid water condensation in the primary system due to the cold cooling
water. On this occasion he observed the temperature to reach below the low
limit, signaling a demand to switch off the secondary pump, while he was
talking to a co-operator over the phone. He then switched off the primary
pumps and the plant immediately shut down automatically. He did not rec-
ognize the cause immediately, but had to diagnose the situation from the
warning signals.
The control keys for the two sets of pumps are positioned far apart on the
console. A special routine exists during which the operator switches the
primary pumps on and off to allow an operator in the basement to adjust
pump valves after pump overhaul while they communicate by phone. Is the
cause of the event subconscious switching of procedures due to the phone
call?
Comment
The case illustrates some features of operator behavior:
- Change in procedures by secondary, unpredictable events or conditions.
- The operator introduces couplings in the system by coincident omission of
one task and performance of an in appropriate action.
- The risk may be related to the inappropriate and unpredictable act rather
than to the omission.
CASE 3
An experimental plant shuts down automatically during normal operation
due to inadvertent manual operation of cooling system shut off valve.
Investigation
A safety shut-off valve in the cooling system which is routinely closed during
post-shut-down check procedures, was closed manually. The valve control
switch is placed behind the operating console, and so is the switch of a flood
lighting  system used for special operations monitored through closed circuit
television. The switches are neither similar nor closely positioned  The oper-
ator has to pass the valve switch on his way to the flood light switch.
In this case the operator went behind the console to switch off the flood
light, but operated the shut off valves which caused plant shut down
through the interlock system.
Comments
Strongly automated and stereotyped action sequences are frequently initi-
ated by a single conscious decision. If the action takes some time, e.g., you
have to move to another place to perform the action, the mind may return to
other matters, and the sequence is vulnerable to unpredictable conditions,
particularly if the sequence in tended in some of the steps overlap other
familiar and automated sequences.
CASE 4
Butadiene explosion at Texas City. (Loss Prevention, Vol. 5, Am. Inst. Chem.
Eng. 1971).
Investigation
"Loss of butadiene from the system through the leaking overhead line motor
valve resulted in substantial changes in tray composition ...".
..."The loss of liquid in the base of the column uncovered the calandria
tubes, allowing the tube wall temperature to approach the temperature of the
heat supply. The increased vinyl acetylene concentration and high tube wall
temperature set the stage for the explosion which followed".
 ..."The make flow meter showed a continuous flow: however, the operator
assumed that the meter was off calibration since the make motor valve was
closed and the tracing on the chart was a straight line near the base of the
chart. The column base level indicator showed a low level in the base of the
column, but ample kettle vapor was being generated".
Comment
Wisdom after the event tells that closed valve together with continuous flow
signals possible leak, and the risk implied calls for investigation. The skilled
operator, however, conforms his observations individually with his expecta-
tions and process-feel. If abnormal observation refers to a familiar situation,
he sees no problem and does not investigate the matter. You cannot predict
his response without knowing his daily experiences. It can be difficult to
predict the probability that an operator performs a specified function be-
cause he may have re specified his function - sometimes with good reason.
This can happen, even if there is a clear pre warning:
CASE 6
Melt down of fuel element in nuclear reactor. "Nuclear Safety", September
1962.
Investigation
Certain tests required several hundred process cool ant tubes to be blocked
by neoprene disks. Seven disks were left in the system after the test, but
were located by a test of the gauge system that monitors water pressure on
each individual process tube. For some reason the gauge on one tube was
overlooked, and it did not appear in a list of abnormal gauge readings pre-
pared during the test  There was an additional opportunity to spot the
blocked tube when a later test was performed on the system. This time the
pressure for the tube definitely indicated a blocked tube. The shift
supervisor failed, how ever, to recognize this indication of trouble. The gauge
was adjusted at that time by an instrument mechanic to give a mid-scale
reading which for that particular tube was false. This adjustment made it
virtually certain that the no flow condition would exist until serious damage
resulted.
CASE 7
Docket 50219-167: Two diesel generators set out of service simultaneously.
Event Sequence
8.10 permission to perform surveillance test on containment spray system
No. 1 including electrical and mechanical inspection of diesel generator
No. 1.
8.20 permission to take diesel No. 2 out of service for oil addition.
Both systems out of service for 45 min. Foreman over looked test of no. 1
system when permitting diesel no. 2 operation.
Comment
Coincident unavailability of redundant systems caused by improper timing
of routine tasks. Difficult to predict due to dependence on station "software"
vulnerable for changes and oversight due to absence of cues from the system
supporting attention.
